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I. INTRODUCTION 
In State ex rel. Commissioner of Transportation v. Kettleson,1 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court once again faced the eminent domain 
doctrine and its ever pliable public use provision.  The 
government’s use of eminent domain to acquire property for a 
typical highway project is generally uncontroversial2 and involves 
the easiest cases of public use.3  However, Kettleson involved a 
unique set of facts that distinguished it from the many 
unremarkable right-of-way acquisitions, by condemnation or 
otherwise, that the state and county highway departments initiate 
every Minnesota road construction season.4 
In Kettleson, a road reconstruction project effectively 
landlocked an improved parcel of land when the project 
eliminated that parcel’s driveway to the adjacent highway.  To 
remedy the problem, the Minnesota Department of Transportation 
(MnDOT) exercised its eminent domain authority, taking a 
portion of a neighboring parcel to create a new access road to the 
isolated parcel.  This led to another eminent domain challenge 
alleging that the taking of private property was without a valid 
public use.  By upholding the taking, the Minnesota Supreme 
 
 1. 801 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 2011). 
 2. 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.06[3][a] (rev. 
3d. ed. 2009). 
 3. LARRY W. THOMAS, TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH 
PROGRAM, LEGAL DIGEST 56: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF POST-KELO LEGISLATION ON 
STATE TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS 8 (2012) (citing Lynn E. Blais, Urban Revitalization 
in the Post-Kelo Era, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657, 661 (2007)), available at 
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_lrd_56.pdf. 
 4. See MINN. DEP’T TRANSP., GUIDE FOR PROPERTY OWNERS (2007), available at 
http://www.dot.state.mn.us/row/pdfs/Guide_for_Property_Owners_wo_graphics 
.pdf (providing a very general overview of MnDOT’s right-of-way acquisition 
procedure). 
2
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Court reached the correct decision.  However, the court’s public 
use analysis leaves something to be desired.  This note will attempt 
to fill that void. 
In order to put this case in its proper context, Part II of this 
note will provide a brief introduction of eminent domain, the 
public use requirement, and how the public use requirement has 
been interpreted at the federal level and in Minnesota.  Part III will 
outline the facts, arguments, and holding of Kettleson.  The analysis 
in Part IV is intended as an attempt to contextualize the case 
among other landlocked property cases and demonstrate that the 
court made the correct public use decision by analyzing persuasive 
authorities from Minnesota and other jurisdictions, and economic 
theory.  There is no conclusive principle of public use.  Instead, the 
courts are left to balance the facts of each case to locate a 
legitimate public benefit and to restrain condemning authorities 
from acting arbitrarily and capriciously, if necessary.  Without a 
firm test to apply, no one fact is controlling.  By reviewing 
persuasive precedent, similar cases, and an applicable economic 
theory, this analysis seeks to provide points of reference within the 
larger body of public use analysis in an effort to bring further 
support to the court’s decision. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Eminent Domain: Nature, Definition, and Origin 
The power of eminent domain,5 which results in 
condemnation when exercised, is at its very essence “the state-
compelled transfer of property.”6  It is further defined, with 
inclusion of the public use limitation, as “the power of the 
sovereign to take property for public use without the owner’s 
consent.”7  It is said that the power is an inherent sovereign right 
 
 5. The term eminent domain is derivative of the Latin phrase dominium 
eminens, which translates to “supreme lordship” and was first used by Dutch jurist 
Hugo Grotius “to emphasize that ‘the property of subjects is under the eminent 
domain of the state’ so that the state may use, alienate, or destroy such property 
‘not only in the case of extreme necessity . . . but for end of public utility.’”  Daniel 
B. Kelly, Acquiring Land Through Eminent Domain: Justifications, Limitations, and 
Alternatives, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 345 
(Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011). 
 6. Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 
11 ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (1980). 
 7. See SACKMAN, supra note 2, § 1.11. 
3
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that exists in absolute and unlimited form,8 not constitutionally 
granted to the government, but constitutionally limited.9  The 
concept of eminent domain has an expansive history spanning 
centuries and cultures,10 though its precise origin is lost in 
obscurity.11  In early England, property was taken by the king and 
parliament under various circumstances, but there appeared to be 
a lack of any discrete body of law that could be categorized as 
eminent domain and neatly linked to our contemporary concept of 
the power.12 
Early colonial America also lacks a neat narrative to cleanly 
track the modern development of the concept.13  There were many 
instances of nonconsensual land transfers, including the building 
of dams, the building of mills, and the draining of private land.14  
And, it is interesting to note, especially in the context of the 
Kettleson case, that the earliest record of eminent domain in the 
United States was for building roads.15 
 
 8. Id. § 1.14[2] (“[T]he power comes into being eo instante with the 
establishment of the government and continues as long as the government 
endures.  It does not require recognition by constitutional provision, but exists in 
absolute and unlimited form.”). 
 9. Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875) (“The right is the offspring of 
political necessity; and it is inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied to it by its 
fundamental law.”); Barmel v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist., 201 Minn. 622, 
624, 277 N.W. 208, 209 (1938) (“[T]he power of eminent domain being an 
incident of sovereignty, the time, manner, and occasion of its exercise are wholly 
in the control and discretion of the legislature, except as restrained by the 
constitution.” (quoting Fairchild v. St. Paul, 46 Minn. 540, 542, 49 N.W. 325, 325 
(1891))). 
 10. See SACKMAN, supra note 2, §§ 1.2--1.23 (providing a perspective on the 
origin and history of eminent domain, reaching as far back as biblical antiquity, 
and including Roman times). 
 11. Meidinger, supra note 6, at 4.  Scholars debate whether the concept of 
eminent domain existed in any recognizable form as far back as ancient Rome.  Id. 
at 6.  Some commentators point to Rome’s relatively advanced road and aqueduct 
infrastructure as evidence of its early use in some form.  Id. at 7. 
 12. Id. at 8. 
 13. Id. at 13. 
 14. Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An 
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 
500 (2006). 
 15. Meidinger, supra note 6, at 13 (noting a 1639 Massachusetts statute which 
“authorized county courts, upon a complaint stating that a highway was needed, to 
appoint local citizens to lay one out” and provided compensation for affected 
landowners). 
4
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B. “Public Use” and the Takings Clause 
The limitations on eminent domain power in colonial America 
were fairly vague.16  The familiar “public use” limitation first 
emerged in 1776 when it was inserted into Pennsylvania’s and 
Virginia’s constitutions.17  In 1789 the United States Constitution 
was amended by the Bill of Rights, and the “public use” language 
was inserted in the Fifth Amendment.18  The language of the 
amendment’s familiar Takings Clause is, “[N]or shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”19  
Pursuant to the Takings Clause, the valid exercise of the power of 
eminent domain in the United States is subject to only two 
prerequisites: public use and compensation.20 
Unfortunately, public use has been an ambiguous concept 
from the beginning and defining it can often be the most elusive 
task in condemnation cases.21  Throughout the nineteenth century 
the country’s soaring demand for new infrastructure fueled an 
expansion of the use of eminent domain by both public and private 
entities.22  During this time two different schools of thought 
 
 16. Cohen, supra note 14, at 504.  After the Revolutionary War the original 
thirteen states gradually added the public use provision to their constitutions, but 
these provisions “often did not specify the actual permitted uses and limitations of 
the eminent domain power.”  Id. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Meidinger, supra note 6, at 17. 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 20. Id.  This note will not discuss the meaning or purpose of “just 
compensation” in any substantive manner.  This is not to trivialize this component 
of the takings clause, but simply it was not put into controversy in Kettleson.  This 
note will also not cover in any depth the necessity component of eminent domain.  
While Kettleson involved pleadings and a holding on this element, the thrust of the 
case was a public use challenge.  As Kettleson noted, the requisite necessity is 
reasonable necessity to further a proper purpose, not absolute necessity.  State ex 
rel. Commissioner of Transportation v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 167 (Minn. 2011).  A 
finding of necessity will only be overruled if the taking was arbitrary and 
capricious.  Id.  For a thorough treatment of the origin and meaning of the 
necessity requirement, see generally Robert C. Bird & Lynda J. Oswald, Necessity as 
a Check on State Eminent Domain Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 99 (2009). 
 21. See, e.g., State v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 16, 176 N.W. 159, 161 (1920) 
(“The term ‘public use’ is flexible . . . .”).  See generally SACKMAN, supra note 2, 
§ 7.02[1] (“‘[P]ublic use’ . . . does not have a precise and fixed meaning.”). 
 22. Though eminent domain is a government power, during this period the 
power was delegated to private turnpike, canal, and railroad companies.  See 
Meidinger, supra note 6, at 26–27.  Illustrative of the rapid increase in 
infrastructure is the fact that between 1840 and 1860 U.S. railroads expanded 
from 3000 miles of track to 30,000 miles.  Id.  “As the [railroad] industry hit its 
stride in the next several decades, so did its use of eminent domain.”  Id. 
5
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emerged as to the nature of the power: the narrow interpretation 
and the broad interpretation.23  The narrow definition emphasizes 
actual, physical use or employment of the property by the public.24  
The broader definition takes into account the wider public benefit 
or advantage.  Under this view, it has been said: 
Any exercise of eminent domain which tends to enlarge 
resources, increase industrial energies, or promote the 
productive power of any considerable number of 
inhabitants of a state or community manifestly contributes 
to the general welfare and prosperity of the whole 
community and thus constitutes a valid public use.25 
1. Early U.S., Berman & Midkiff 
By the early twentieth century the United States Supreme 
Court had written off the narrow view of public use.26  The 
contemporary view of public use, specifically characterized by 
judicial deference to legislative determinations of public use, began 
to take shape in 1954 when the Supreme Court decided the 
influential case Berman v. Parker.27  The appellants in Berman sought 
to enjoin the condemnation of their property, which the District of 
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency sought under the District 
of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.28  The taking of a non-
blighted department store within an otherwise largely blighted 
redevelopment area was challenged on the basis that it was not for 
a public use as required by the Takings Clause.29  The court 
articulated the prevailing view of judicial deference to legislative 
determinations of public use when it stated: 
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the 
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been 
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.  In such cases the 
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the 
 
 23. SACKMAN, supra note 2, § 7.02[1]. 
 24. Id. § 7.02[2].  
 25. Id. § 7.02[3]. 
 26. Rindge Co. v. L.A. Cnty., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (“[It is] not essential 
that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, should directly 
enjoy or participate in an improvement in order to constitute a public use.”); 
Cohen, supra note 14, at 509 (“The inadequacy of the use by the general public as 
a universal test is established.” (citing Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. 
Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916))). 
 27. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 28. Id. at 28–29. 
 29. Id. 
6
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public needs to be served by social legislation, whether it 
be Congress legislating concerning the District of 
Columbia, or the States legislating concerning local 
affairs.  This principle admits of no exception merely 
because the power of eminent domain is involved.  The 
role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is 
being exercised for public purpose is an extremely narrow 
one.30 
Thirty years later in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the 
next major public use challenge reached the Supreme Court.31  
The Court took much the same approach, heavily citing the Berman 
decision.  In Midkiff, the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967, “which 
created a land condemnation scheme whereby title in real property 
is taken from lessors and transferred to lessees in order to reduce 
the concentration of land ownership,”32 was challenged on the basis 
of not having a public purpose to sustain a valid exercise of 
eminent domain.  Once again, the Court deferred to the legislative 
body’s public use determination.  The Court stated: 
In short, the Court has made clear that it will not 
substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to 
what constitutes a public use “unless the use be palpably 
without reasonable foundation.” . . . 
. . . But where the exercise of the eminent domain power 
is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the 
Court has never held a compensated taking to be 
proscribed by the Public Use Clause.33 
The seminal decisions of Berman and Midkiff paved the way for Kelo 
v. City of New London,34 the famous Supreme Court public use 
decision that was wildly unpopular,35 yet arguably consistent.36 
 
 30. Id. at 32 (citations omitted). 
 31. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 32. Id. at 229.  The Hawaii Legislature concluded that this concentration of 
ownership “was responsible for skewing the State’s residential fee simple market, 
inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare.”  Id. at 232. 
 33. Id. at 241 (citation omitted). 
 34. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 35. In 2005, Zogby and Saint Index conducted a national survey on Kelo in 
which 95% and 81% of respondents, respectively, opposed the decision.  Ilya 
Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
2100, 2108–11 (2009) (summarizing the survey results). 
 36. Compare John M. Zuck, Kelo v. City of New London: Despite the Outcry, the 
Decision is Firmly Supported by Precedent—However, Eminent Domain Critics Still Have 
Gained Ground, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 187, 192 (2007) (“[U]ltimately the Supreme 
Court has remained consistent in its decisions.”), with James W. Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo 
7
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2. The Kelo Decision 
Kelo involved a public use challenge by owners of non-blighted 
property located within a larger area targeted by the state and the 
city in a comprehensive redevelopment plan.37  The City of New 
London had been identified by the State of Connecticut as an 
economically distressed area and the redevelopment plan was 
intended to spur economic development.38  The appellant’s land 
was taken through the power of eminent domain simply because it 
happened to be located within the boundaries of the 
redevelopment area.39 
A divided Supreme Court, citing Berman and Midkiff, 
reaffirmed the precedential, judicial deference, stating, “[For] 
more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely 
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording 
legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify 
the use of the takings power.”40  Citing the “comprehensive 
character” of the redevelopment plan, the “thorough deliberation 
that preceded its adoption, and [the Court’s] limited scope of . . . 
review,” the majority held that “[b]ecause that plan unquestionably 
serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the 
public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.”41  Perhaps the 
most influential words of the decision were contained in the final 
paragraph where Justice Stevens reminded state legislatures that 
“nothing in [the Court’s] opinion precludes any State from placing 
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”42 
 
 
Reform: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 127, 128 (2009) 
(“Such a myopic assessment is sadly wide of the mark.  It rests largely upon 
sweeping language in previous Supreme Court opinions rather than a careful look 
at the factual circumstances at issue in particular cases.”). 
 37. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474–75.  The ninety-acre redevelopment plan included 
the creation of Fort Trumbull State Park and a $300 million research facility to be 
built by pharmaceutical company Pfizer Inc.  Id. at 473.  The Pfizer facility was 
seen as the catalyst for the revitalization of the redevelopment area and the New 
London downtown.  Id. at 474. 
 38. Id. at 473. 
 39. Id. at 475. 
 40. Id. at 483. 
 41. Id. at 484. 
 42. Id. at 489. 
8
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3. The Legislative Response to Kelo 
Following Kelo, the perceived threat to private property rights 
led to a public and media firestorm, and ignited a national debate 
on the proper limitation of eminent domain.43  State legislatures 
across the country took Justice Stevens’ words to heart, as 
approximately forty-three states, including Minnesota, ultimately 
amended their eminent domain statutes.44  Many of these legislative 
amendments were specifically targeted at limiting eminent domain 
powers in the economic development context, especially where 
there was a transfer to “private” entities.45  However, commentators 
have found that, with certain exceptions, these statutory changes 
have neither been effective in curbing states’ abilities to take 
property for economic development purposes, nor in providing 
citizens with increased protection of their property.46 
In light of the Kettleson decision it is especially relevant to note 
the cumulative effect, if any, this wave of new legislation has had on 
road projects and the ability of highway departments to use 
eminent domain in the execution of their work.  The National 
Cooperative Highway Research Program (the “NCHRP”) published 
a fairly comprehensive report addressing this question.47  The 
report concluded that “most state DOTs [Departments of 
Transportation] have not been affected by the states’ constitutional 
and legislative changes in response to the Kelo decision.”48  In fact, 
at least thirteen states explicitly provided “that the post-Kelo 
restrictions do not apply to takings for the purpose of constructing, 
maintaining, or operating streets and highways.”49  However, some 
 
 43. See generally Michael Allan Wolf, Hysteria Versus History: Public Use in the 
Public Eye, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 
15 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008) (dissecting the media coverage and subsequent 
public reaction after the Kelo decision was announced). 
 44. Somin, supra note 35, at 2102.  
 45. Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Federal 
Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Year Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 707 (2011). 
 46. Somin, supra note 35, at 2171 (“Despite broad and strongly felt public 
opposition to Kelo and economic development takings . . . the majority of states 
failed to enact effective reform legislation banning them.”); see also Mihaly & 
Smith, supra note 45, at 708 (“[M]uch of the legislation ‘passed in the wake of Kelo 
was substantially cosmetic and will likely have little or no effect on economic 
development takings.’” (quoting EDWARD J. ERLER, IN KELO’S WAKE 12–13 (2008), 
available at http://www.hillsdale.edu/images/userImages/rvanopstal/Page_6542 
/Erler_2_Final.doc)). 
 47. THOMAS, supra note 3. 
 48. Id. at 8. 
 49. Id. at 9. 
9
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state DOTs reported that eminent domain reforms have increased 
right-of-way acquisition costs50 and imposed new procedural time 
constraints that make the use of eminent domain less attractive as a 
property acquisition tool.51  Another common element of eminent 
domain reforms identified by the NCHRP is the requirement that 
condemned property be retained for public ownership and 
prohibited from being transferred to a private entity.52 
C. Eminent Domain in Minnesota 
1. Public Use 
The constitutional restraint in Minnesota mirrors that of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, providing, “Private property 
shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without 
just compensation therefor[e], first paid or secured.”53  City of 
Duluth v. State is a foundational and widely cited Minnesota case 
that illustrates the state’s adoption of the broad definition of public 
use.54  In City of Duluth, the court upheld the condemnation of 
private, commercial property in order to develop a new, privately 
operated papermill.55  The court reasoned that, despite the fact 
that the condemnation would benefit private interests, the taking 
was not unconstitutional because it would further the broader 
public purposes of providing employment, increasing the city tax 
base, and revitalizing a deteriorating urban area.56  The court 
endorsed the broad view of public use when stating, “What 
constitutes a public use . . . is, of course, a judicial decision; 
however, in light of the deferential scope of review, this court has 
construed the words ‘public use’ broadly.”57  Historically, the court 
 
 50. Id. at 24.  
 51. Id. at 25.  
 52. Id. at 10.  The language of these public use definitions that require public 
ownership, are extremely similar to Minnesota’s definition of public use.  See infra 
note 66.  For example, Iowa’s definition of public use provides in part, “The 
possession, occupation, and enjoyment of property by the general public or 
governmental entities.”  THOMAS, supra note 3, at 10. 
 53. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.  It should also be noted that the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
See Chi., B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
 54. 390 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1986).  
 55. Id. at 760. 
 56. Id. at 763 (citing City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 
1980)). 
 57. Id.  
10
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has used the words “public use” interchangeably with the words 
“public purpose.”58  Subsequent high profile Minnesota economic 
development cases affirmed this broad definition of public use,59 
but resistance to this liberal application of eminent domain began 
to build.60  Like it had in so many other states, the Kelo decision 
provided the final impetus for the Legislature to act. 
2. 2006 Legislative Revision 
In April 2006, shortly after Kelo, the Minnesota Legislature 
took up the task of scrutinizing the eminent domain statute61 and 
analyzing the definition of public use, particularly in the economic 
development context.62  By May of the same year, a significant 
revision to the statute was enacted (the “2006 Amendments”).63  Of 
particular interest to this case are the preemption clause64 and the 
new definition of public use and public purpose.65  Minnesota 
Statutes section 117.025, subdivision 11(a) provides the critical 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. ex rel. City of Richfield v. Walser Auto  
Sales, Inc. 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002) (3-3 decision) (affirming that 
condemnation of land containing operating auto dealerships, in connection with 
a redevelopment plan, mainly involving the construction of the Best Buy corporate 
headquarters, is a public use and is authorized under the Minnesota economic 
development statute, section 469 (2000)). 
 60. Paul B. Zisla, How Recent Case Law and Legislative Developments in Eminent 
Domain Will Impact You, in NAT’L BUS. INST., EMINENT DOMAIN: LEGAL UPDATE 1, 4 
(2006) (describing the Minnesota Auto Dealers’ post-Walser effort to lobby the 
legislature for changes to the eminent domain statute). 
 61. MINN. STAT. §§ 117.012–.57 (2010). 
 62. See MINN. S. COMM. ON TRANSP., S. 84-2006 TRP, Reg. Sess. (2006), reprinted 
in MN S. Comm. Up., 2006 TRP (Mar. 31, 2006) (Westlaw).  During this 
committee hearing, Senator Thomas Bakk, lead author of the revisions to the 
eminent domain statute, stated his “goal with the bill is to stop the use of eminent 
domain for economic development purposes.”  Id.  In addition, he said that “[t]he 
heart of the bill is in provisions defining public uses or public purposes.”  Id. 
 63. Act of May 19, 2006, ch. 214, 2006 Minn. Laws 195, 195 (“An act relating 
to eminent domain; making changes to and regulating the exercise of eminent 
domain; providing for public use or purpose and providing other definitions; 
providing for notice, hearing, and other procedural requirements; providing for 
attorney fees and additional forms of compensation . . . .”). 
 64. MINN. STAT. § 117.012 (2010).  Subdivision 1 added the following 
preemption language: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any 
. . . statute, . . . all condemning authorities . . . must exercise the power of eminent 
domain in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.”  Id.  Subdivision 2 
echoes the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions by again expressly stating that 
“[e]minent domain may only be used for a public use or a public purpose.”  Id. 
 65. Id. § 117.025, subdiv. 11. 
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thrust of the amendment by providing, “‘[P]ublic use’ or ‘public 
purpose’ means, exclusively: (1) the possession, occupation, 
ownership, and enjoyment of the land by the general public, or by 
public agencies.”66  In comparison to other jurisdictions’ eminent 
domain statute revisions, the 2006 Amendments are seen as 
establishing intermediate limitations on the use of eminent domain 
for economic development purposes.67 
3. MnDOT’s Eminent Domain Authority 
Though not directly at issue in this case,68 it is relevant to 
understand the MnDOT constitutional mandate and eminent 
domain powers.  The Minnesota Constitution provides that “a 
trunk highway system . . . shall be constructed, improved, and 
maintained as public highways by the state.”69  Pursuant to this 
constitutional provision, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held 
that condemnation of land for the purpose of the trunk highway 
system is an established public use.70  The Legislature has delegated 
to the Commissioner of Transportation (the “commissioner”) the 
responsibility of carrying out this constitutional provision.71  Under  
this legislative grant, MnDOT has “broad authority in highway 
matters.”72  This authority includes selecting “the particular course 
 
 66. Id.  The balance of the definition of public use or public purpose 
includes: “the creation or functioning of a public service corporation; or 
mitigation of a blighted area, remediation of an environmentally contaminated 
area, reduction of abandoned property, or removal of a public nuisance.”  Id.  
Subdivision 11 concludes by stating, “The public benefits of economic 
development, including an increase in tax base, tax revenues, employment, or 
general economic health, do not by themselves constitute a public use or public 
purpose.”  Id. 
 67. Mihaly & Smith, supra note 45, at 713–14.  The authors note that the 2006 
Amendments are less strict than other states with “strong limitations” primarily 
because Minnesota does not prohibit economic development benefits from being 
a reason to use eminent domain, though they cannot be the only reason.  Id. 
 68. State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 162 n.1 
(Minn. 2011) (noting that the taking of land to be used exclusively for the 
highway was not challenged). 
 69. MINN. CONST. art. XIV, § 2. 
 70. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hilton v. Voll, 155 Minn. 72, 72, 192 N.W. 188, 188 
(1923) (“[T]he Constitution determines that the taking of the right of way 
necessary for the trunk highway system is for public use.”). 
 71. MINN. STAT. § 161.20, subdiv. 1 (“The commissioner shall carry out the 
provisions of article 14, section 2, of the Constitution . . . .”). 
 72. State ex rel. Head v. Christopher, 284 Minn. 233, 233, 170 N.W.2d 95, 96 
(1969).  
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and necessary land for the trunk highways.”73 
By statute, MnDOT is authorized “to acquire . . . by eminent 
domain proceedings as provided by law, in fee or such lesser estate 
as the commissioner deems necessary, all lands and properties 
necessary . . . in laying out, constructing, maintaining, and 
improving the trunk highway system.”74  Much like the legislative 
decisions of public use in City of Duluth, Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo, 
MnDOT’s decisions regarding locating the highway right-of-way are 
given substantial deference by the courts.75  Drawing on decades of 
precedent, State ex rel. Mondale v. Ohman provided a succinct 
statement of the broad judicial deference given to MnDOT by 
stating “the courts may not interfere with the determination of the 
commissioner of highways, acting for the state in its sovereign 
capacity, if his determinations have a reasonable basis and are not 
arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory.”76 
MnDOT also has been granted statutory authority to use 
eminent domain to address the issue of access to property isolated 
as a result of highway construction.77  Minnesota Statutes section 
161.24, subdivision 4, entitled “Access to isolated property,” 
provides: 
When the . . . reconstruction of a trunk highway closes off 
any other . . . private road, or entrance at the boundary of 
the trunk highway, the commissioner may, in mitigation 
of damages . . . construct a road either within or outside 
the limits of the trunk highway, connecting the closed-
off . . . private road . . . with another public highway.  In 
determining whether to build the road within or outside 
the limits of the trunk highway, the commissioner may 
take into consideration economy to the state and local 
traffic needs.78 
The statute goes on to state that “[a]ll lands necessary for 
connecting a . . . private road . . . to another public highway . . . 
may be acquired by . . . condemnation.”79  The phrases “in 
mitigation of damages” and “economy to the state” are indicative of 
 
 73. Voll, 155 Minn. at 73, 192 N.W. at 189. 
 74. MINN. STAT. § 161.20, subdiv. 2(a)(1). 
 75. See, e.g., Voll, 155 Minn. at 76, 192 N.W. at 190. 
 76. 263 Minn. 115, 119–20, 116 N.W.2d 101, 104 (1962) (citing State ex rel. 
Peterson v. Severson, 194 Minn. 644, 261 N.W. 469 (1935)). 
 77. MINN. STAT. § 161.24, subdiv. 4. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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the need for state highway departments to take into account the 
financial consequences of their planning decisions.  And the 
problem of isolated property—as contemplated in this statute and 
as encountered in Kettleson—makes salient this point. 
III. THE KETTLESON DECISION 
A. Facts of the Case 
In 2008, 3½ miles of Trunk Highway 61 (TH 61) overlooking 
Lake Superior between Tofte and Lutsen was due for 
reconstruction (the Project).80  MnDOT’s plan for the Project 
included adding wider shoulders, passing lanes, and turning lanes 
in order to improve highway safety.81  To achieve the Project’s 
objectives, MnDOT determined it must acquire additional right-of-
way property from landowners adjacent to the Project area.82  
Exercising its statutory authority, on August 29, 2008, MnDOT filed 
a condemnation petition in Cook County District Court seeking 
transfer of title and possession of certain portions of twenty-three 
parcels along the Project area.83  One property affected by this 
petition, and the subject of this discussion, was appellant Richard 
Lepak’s unimproved property (Parcel 15) north of and adjacent to 
TH 61.84  In its petition, MnDOT sought to take a 110-foot-deep 
strip of Lepak’s Parcel 15—the full length of his property adjacent  
to and parallel with TH 61.85  The 75-foot-deep strip of Parcel 15 
closest to the road was to be used exclusively for the planned 
improvements of TH 61 and was not challenged by Lepak.86 
 
 80. MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ANNUAL REPORT ON MAJOR HIGHWAY PROJECTS 
A12 (2011), available at http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/mandated 
/110142.pdf (summarizing the Project’s history, objectives, schedule, and cost 
estimate). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Respondent’s Brief at 3, State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 
N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 2011) (No. A09-1894), 2010 WL 7367170, at *3. 
 83. Appellant’s Brief & Addendum at 5, Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160 (No. A09-
1894), 2010 WL 7367169at *5. 
 84. Id. at 6. 
 85. Id.  In addition, MnDOT sought a temporary easement taking of a twenty-
foot section of land immediately north of and adjacent to the fee taking.  
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 4–5.  The temporary easement taking was not 
challenged by Lepak.  Id. at 3. 
 86. Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 83, at 6–7. 
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B. Lepak’s and MnDOT’s Arguments 
At the November 18, 2008, hearing on MnDOT’s petition, 
Lepak objected to the taking of the remaining 35-foot-wide strip of 
the 110-foot-deep fee taking.87  Lepak objected on the basis that the 
35-foot strip was to be used to construct a new road to provide the 
neighboring, improved Parcel 14, directly to the west of Parcel 15, 
with access to the reconstructed TH 61.88  Parcel 14 previously had 
direct access to TH 61 by a driveway on its own property, but that 
access would be eliminated by the reconstruction project, 
rendering it landlocked.89  Lepak characterized this new road to be 
built across the entirety of his as a “private access” used to restore 
Parcel 14’s connection to TH 61.90  He contended that, as a private 
access, it was an improper taking because it was “not for a public 
use or public purpose and, therefore, is prohibited by Minnesota 
law.”91 
Further, Lepak argued that the judicial deference and broad 
construction of public use and public purpose articulated in City of 
Duluth was overruled by the 2006 Amendments.92  Lepak contended 
that the new narrow, exclusive definition of public use and public 
purpose “repudiated the broad interpretation” of these terms.93  
Finally, Lepak asserted that MnDOT’s statutory authority in section 
161.24 to provide access to isolated properties requires the broad 
interpretation of public use that was “preempted by the 2006 
Amendments to Minnesota’s eminent domain laws to the extent it 
purports to authorize such a taking.”94 
In support of the taking, MnDOT asserted a series of 
arguments, all of which paralleled common arguments expressed 
in similar cases.95  MnDOT characterized the road, not as a “private 
road,” but as a “public access road” that will serve three parcels, not 
just Parcel 14,96 and will be open to the traveling public.97  MnDOT 
 
 87. Id. at 5–6. 
 88. Id. at 6. 
 89. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 6–7. 
 90. Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 83, at 6. 
 91. Id. at 5. 
 92. Id. at 11–12. 
 93. Id. at 11. 
 94. Id. at 12. 
 95. See infra Part IV.B.2.b. 
 96. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 6.  A third parcel, Parcel 16, which is 
also unimproved and directly east of Parcel 15, was involved in this condemnation 
but was not at issue in the case.  Id. 
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sought to distinguish a public road from a private road by 
reasoning: 
It is the right of travel by public, and not the exercise of 
the right, that constitutes a public roadway.  The actual 
amount of travel should not be material—if it is open to 
all who desire to use it, [it] is a public roadway even 
though it may be used by only a limited portion of the 
traveling public . . . .98 
MnDOT also contended that access road falls within the new 
statutory definition of public use, specifically the “possession, 
occupation, ownership, and enjoyment” clause.99  By retaining title 
and possession of the access road and not transferring an interest 
to a private party, MnDOT would satisfy this requirement. 
In addition, MnDOT argued that Minnesota’s public purpose 
analysis only requires that a public purpose be established for the 
whole of a project, not for each individual aspect, such as the access 
road.100  MnDOT pointed out that past Minnesota eminent domain 
cases were analyzed under a two-step framework of public use and 
reasonable necessity, and that the 2006 Amendments have no 
language demonstrating legislative intent to change that framework 
by adding additional steps of analyzing separate components of the 
challenged taking.101 
MnDOT offered additional statutory authority to condemn a 
portion of Lepak’s land.102  MnDOT asserted the authority found in 
both Minnesota Statutes section 160.18 and section 161.24.103  
Section 160.18 provides that “road authorities . . . in relocating or 
reconstructing an old highway shall construct suitable approaches 
thereto within the limits of the right-of-way . . . so as to provide 
abutting owners a reasonable means of access to such highway.”104  
Section 161.24 is an express provision for restoring access to 
property isolated by a highway project.105 
Lastly, both Lepak and MnDOT recognized that this dispute 
 
 97. Id. at 15. 
 98. Id. at 14. 
 99. Id. at 19. 
 100. Id. at 10–13. 
 101. Id. at 10–12. 
 102. Id. at 20–21. 
 103. Id. 
 104. MINN. STAT. § 160.18, subdiv. 2 (2010). 
 105. Id. § 161.24. 
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was one of economics and the efficient use of resources.106  MnDOT 
pointed out that if the court held in Lepak’s favor, denying the 
condemnation, the court would “invalidate a taking that affects just 
a small portion of his unimproved property, which in turn would 
result in the economic destruction of his neighbor’s improved 
property.  Such a result would hardly be fair or just.”107  Lepak 
countered that while MnDOT had a “substantial financial 
incentive” to avoid compensating the owner of the landlocked 
parcel for the “economic destruction” of that property, the new 
narrow definition of public use made no mention of such an 
exercise of eminent domain.108  Therefore, the taking was without 
legal basis. 
C. District Court and Court of Appeals Decisions 
On November 25, 2008, one week after the original hearing, 
the district court granted MnDOT’s condemnation petition.109  
Lepak appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.110  The court of 
appeals remanded the case back to the district court for a specific 
finding on Lepak’s objection that the private-access access road was 
not a public use or public purpose.111  In an August 12, 2009, order, 
the district court held that the project as a whole provided a proper 
public purpose, and MnDOT did not need to show a public 
purpose for every aspect of the project, including the disputed 
road.112  The district court reached this conclusion by reasoning 
that “once MnDOT establishes a broad public purpose, it need only 
prove that a challenged aspect of the project is reasonably 
necessary to further that purpose.”113  The district court found the 
widening of TH 61 had a legitimate public purpose and the 
disputed access road to be reasonably necessary to serve the 
 
 106. See Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 83, at 8 (discussing the 
State’s duty to compensate the owner of Parcel 14 for the lost access); 
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 18. 
 107. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 18. 
 108. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2–4, State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. 
Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 2011) (No. A09-1894), 2010 WL 7367171. 
 109. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 3. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, No. A09–1894, 2010 WL 
2813456, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 20, 2012); Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, 
at 2. 
 113. Kettleson, 2010 WL 2813456, at *2. 
17
Sellke: Property: Eminent Domain and Restoring Access to Parcels Isolated
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
  
2012] FINDING THE PUBLIC USE 353 
legitimate highway expansion.114 
A divided court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling 
in an unpublished decision dated July 20, 2010.115  First, the court 
of appeals found that the 2006 Amendments did not disturb the 
long-standing judicial deference to a condemning authority’s 
public use determination.116  The court pointed out that the 
deferential “clearly erroneous” standard of review for public use 
evaluations discussed in City of Duluth was still valid and cited with 
approval subsequent to the statutory amendment.117  Next, the 
court concluded that the appellant’s assertion that the access road 
was to be a private driveway was without support.118  Instead, citing 
the subdivision of Minnesota Statutes section 117.025 defining 
public purpose as “the possession, occupation, ownership, and 
enjoyment of the land by the general public, or by public agencies,” 
the court determined that MnDOT was seeking to possess and 
occupy a “public-highway access road for use and enjoyment by the 
owners of three adjacent parcels of land.”119  Therefore, a valid 
public purpose was established.120  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
granted Lepak’s petition for further review to evaluate the validity 
of the challenged taking in light of the new statutory definition.121 
D. Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
The supreme court reached the same decision as the lower 
courts, holding that the proposed taking fell “squarely within” the 
new statutory definition of public use.122  To reach this conclusion, 
the court first found that the 2006 Amendments had not disturbed 
the broad deference the courts give to condemning authorities.123  
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at *4. 
 116. Id. at *1. 
 117. Id.  The court of appeals cited City of Willmar v. Kvam, 769 N.W.2d 775, 
780 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009), and City of Granite Falls v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 742 
N.W.2d 690, 697 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), to show that the previous standard had 
been cited with approval.  Kettleson, 2010 WL 2813456, at *1. 
 118. Id. at *2. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  The court also discussed reasonable necessity and found that “the 
state provided a valid public purpose for the highway project and showed that the 
taking was reasonably necessary to further that purpose.”  Id. at *4. 
 121. State ex. rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 163 (Minn. 
2011). 
 122. Id. at 166. 
 123. Id. at 165.  The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals in finding 
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Specifically, the 2006 Amendments did not change the legislative 
nature of the government’s eminent domain power.124  The court 
pointed out that “MnDOT has been specifically authorized by the 
Legislature to condemn property directly on its behalf” and that 
“[n]othing in [section 117.02 of the 2006 Amendments] disturbs 
the long-standing principle of deference by the courts to the 
Commissioner’s legislative decision-making in condemning private 
property to build highways.”125  The court’s role is to ensure that 
takings “are within such discretionary power rather than an 
arbitrary or discriminatory exercise of the legislative 
prerogatives.”126 
The court then enumerated three reasons why it found this 
taking to fit squarely within the statutory definition of public use 
and public purpose.  First, it cited MnDOT’s broad authority to 
administer the state’s transportation policies and plans and held 
that the Highway 61 Project was “without question a transportation 
plan with the over-arching purpose of providing a public 
benefit.”127  The court then reasoned that, because MnDOT would 
hold title and possession to the access road, the statutory 
requirement of “possession, occupation, ownership, and enjoyment 
of the land by the general public, or by public agencies” was met.128  
Third, because the road would lie within the public right-of-way 
and there was no evidence offered that the public would be 
excluded, the court maintained that the “enjoyment of the access 
road is established to be for the general public.”129  After asserting  
these three points, the court concluded that “[w]hile no single fact 
is controlling, we conclude, on the record before us, that MnDOT 
has demonstrated a proper public purpose for the taking.”130 
 
 
the case law precedent for this deferential standard was still cited with approval 
subsequent to the 2006 Amendments.  Id.; see also supra note 117 and 
accompanying text. 
 124. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d at 165. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 165–66 (quoting Pearce v. Vill. of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 571, 118 
N.W.2d 659, 671 (1962)). 
 127. Id. at 166. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 167. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The court’s holding that “no single fact is controlling” is 
indicative of the ongoing difficulty, or perhaps impossibility,131 of 
conclusively defining public use, even when the legislature speaks.  
As the leading commentary on eminent domain states: “In any 
given case, a use clearly conducive to the welfare of the community, 
or which more closely conforms with the local practices and 
conditions of the people of a state, governs the judiciary’s 
construction of the meaning of ‘public use’ for that community.”132  
Add this expansive notion of judicial construction to the standard 
that MnDOT decisions will not be interfered with as long they have 
“a reasonable basis and are not arbitrary, capricious, or 
discriminatory,”133 and one would understand why some say that 
challenging public purpose in a road case “is likely a waste of time 
and money.”134 
The court set the stage for its public use analysis by correctly 
refuting Lepak’s contention that the 2006 Amendments overruled 
decades of broad judicial deference to condemning authorities’ 
decisions.  And it correctly reaffirmed the only if arbitrary, 
capricious, or discriminatory standard of review.  However, with no 
Minnesota case directly on point and by confining its decision 
strictly to the new statutory definition of public use, the court 
offered a thin analysis of public use.  The court omitted a large 
volume of persuasive precedent that would have been helpful in 
showing this decision’s place within the panoply of similar public 
use challenges.  Defining public use “has never been 
accomplished.”135  So instead of trying to do the impossible in 
defense of this decision, this analysis will draw on this array of 
persuasive authority from Minnesota, other jurisdictions, and 
economic theory, in an attempt to add color and clarity to the 
Kettleson court’s public use holding. 
These persuasive authorities suggest that the court properly 
discerned the nature of a public road as it has been historically 
recognized in Minnesota.  Namely, public roads are defined by 
 
 131. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 44 (2004) (“A ‘public use’ defies absolute 
definition for it changes with varying conditions of society . . . .”). 
 132. SACKMAN, supra note 2, § 7.02[1]. 
 133. See MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 134. Robert Lindall & Howard A. Roston, Litigation of Public Purpose, in 
EMINENT DOMAIN LAW § 3, at 8 (Minn. CLE, 2006). 
 135. SACKMAN, supra note 2, § 7.02[1]. 
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open public access, not by a specific number of public users.  The 
court did not expressly rule on the continuing validity of section 
161.24 and its “economy of state” rationale or whether the project 
“taken as a whole” is controlling.136  However, the court indirectly, 
yet properly, recognized the validity of these arguments, which is 
demonstrated by their wide application in a variety of similar 
cases.137  Finally, while not discussed by the court, the fundamental 
economic theory of eminent domain provides additional support to 
the decision, even if this rationale falls outside of a traditional legal 
analysis. 
A. Starting Off Right: Legislative Intent and the Arbitrary and 
Capricious Standard 
Before proceeding to discuss public use, it is necessary to 
briefly address two critical points the court got right.  First, the 
court clearly rejected the argument that the 2006 Amendments 
overruled the precedent of broad judicial deference to public 
use.138  The court stated that all of its use of statutory interpretation 
is to determine the intent of the Legislature.139  Part of this analysis 
may include looking at the “circumstances surrounding the law’s 
enactment.”140  The 2006 Amendments were a direct consequence 
of rulings, such as Kelo and Walser, where people’s homes and 
businesses were being taken for economic development that 
appeared to be for the benefit of large corporations like Best Buy 
and Pfizer.141  One of the lead drafters of the 2006 Amendments 
stated that the amendments were to “stop the use of eminent 
domain for economic development purposes.”142  Considering 
these circumstances surrounding the 2006 Amendments, it hardly 
seems valid to say that the Legislature intended to create a regime 
in Minnesota with a strict, narrow definition of public use rules in 
all situations, including highway construction.  By maintaining the 
possibility that the benefits of economic development could still be 
 
 136. See State ex. rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 166–67 
(Minn. 2011). 
 137. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 138. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d at 165–66. 
 139. Id. at 166. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 474–75 (2005); Hous. & 
Redevelopment Auth. ex rel. City of Richfield v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc. 641 N.W.2d 
885, 891 (Minn. 2002); supra notes 36 & 58 and accompanying text. 
 142. See MINN. S. COMM. ON TRANSP., supra note 62; text accompanying note 62. 
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reasons for using eminent domain, the Legislature demonstrated it 
was not endorsing the strict view of public use that Lepak 
suggests.143  Constricting MnDOT’s “essential legislative function”144 
was not the Legislature’s intent and the supreme court correctly 
recognized that. 
Second, it is important to point out that the “not arbitrary, 
capricious, or discriminatory” standard correctly applied by the 
court is a high hurdle.145  It is difficult to find a published appellate 
court decision where a MnDOT decision was overruled under this 
standard.146  One 2001 case was reversed because the eminent 
domain statute permitted the condemnee to appeal the damage 
award, but not the public use or necessity.147  The statute was 
deemed unconstitutional because condemnees are entitled to a 
judicial review of these elements.148  Looking at the Kettleson facts, it 
is hard to argue that MnDOT’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, 
or discriminatory.  The access road was placed so three adjoining 
parcels would have opportunity to utilize it.149  The testimony of 
MnDOT’s engineer showed at least some level of forethought and 
planning.150  There were no allegations that Lepak was singled out 
or given prejudicial treatment in any way.  On balance, there is a 
void of evidence of any arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory 
actions by MnDOT that would make this a judicially reversible 
legislative decision. 
 
 143. See MINN. STAT. §§ 117.012, 117.025, subdiv. 11; supra notes 64, 66 and 
accompanying text. 
 144. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d at 163. 
 145. Id. at 165. 
 146. Searches in Westlaw under (“eminent domain” & “department of 
transportation”), (“eminent domain” & “commissioner of highways”), and 
(“eminent domain” & “county highway”) did not yield any decisions where the 
court overturned a MnDOT decision about planning of highways.  This is not 
conclusive, but it at the very least shows the infrequency of such an occurrence.  
One non-highway exercise of eminent domain that failed to meet this generous 
benchmark is a case in which the University of Minnesota sought to condemn land 
for which it had no specific purpose; the court found that a speculative stockpiling 
of land for some unknown future use was an inadequate justification for a 
condemnation action.  Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co., 552 
N.W.2d 578 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). 
 147. In re Damages to Rapp, 621 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 148. Id. at 785. 
 149. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 6. 
 150. Id. at 5. 
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B. Finding the Public Use: The Power of Persuasive Precedent 
1. How to Distinguish Between a “Private” and “Public” Road 
The court reached its public use conclusion in part by finding 
that the access road is public because there was no evidence that 
members of the public would be excluded from using it.151  
However, the court did not elaborate on why this made it a “public 
road.”  In Minnesota, distinguishing between a “private” and a 
“public” road is not intuitively measured strictly by the quantity of 
people directly using or benefiting from any given road.  That a 
public road is defined by open access to it by the public, not by 
volume of use by the public is a proposition with strong precedent 
in Minnesota, specifically under the Minnesota cartway statute.152  
This statute and its related case law are helpful for lending 
persuasive support to the court’s holding. 
A cartway “is merely a classification of a type of public road, 
unique in character because it principally benefits an individual 
instead of the general public.”153  Minnesota’s cartway statute reads 
in part: 
Upon petition presented to the town board by the owner 
of a tract of land . . . who has no access thereto except 
over a navigable waterway or over the lands of others, or 
whose access thereto is less than two rods in width, the 
town board by resolution shall establish a cartway at least 
two rods wide connecting the petitioner’s land with a 
public road.154 
The cartway statute does not apply to Kettleson,155 but it offers strong 
 
 151. State ex. rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Minn. 
2011). 
 152. MINN. STAT. § 164.08 (2010).  Many states have similar acts, sometimes 
referring to them as private road acts that allow a landlocked property owner to 
petition the local government to establish a road over the property of a neighbor 
in order for the landlocked owner to have access to a public way.  See Kristin 
Kanski, Note, Property Law—Minnesota’s Lakeshore Property Owners Without Road Access 
Find Themselves Up a Creek Without a Paddle—In Re Daniel for the Establishment of 
Cartway, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 725, 729 n.34 (2003) (providing a list of similar 
state statutes). 
 153. Kanski, supra note 152, at 726 n.4 (citing 39 AM. JUR. 2D Cartways § 6 
(2002)). 
 154. MINN. STAT. § 164.08, subdiv. 2 (including different provisions depending 
on the size of the parcel for which the petitioner is seeking relief). 
 155. If MnDOT had left Parcel 14 without a driveway, perhaps the owner could 
have proceeded under the cartway statute.  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 5.  
However, Parcel 14 was likely not strictly landlocked as this concept is understood 
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guidance as to how Minnesota courts have analyzed this difficult 
private versus public distinction.  In Rask v. Town Board, the 
appellant made a similar argument to Lepak when it contended 
that a certain cartway was a “private road” because H. J. Rask, the 
petitioner, would be the person “principally benefited.”156  
However, the court held: 
[T]he public, without doubt, has an interest in having 
access to the farm in question.  A determination of 
whether a way be public or private does not depend upon 
the number of people who use it, but upon the fact that 
everyone desiring to do so may lawfully use it.  The right 
to use, and not the extent of the use, controls.157 
This concept was rationalized by equating public use with “‘any 
use . . . which will satisfy a reasonable public demand for public 
facilities for travel or for transmission of intelligence or 
commodities.’”158  This holding is in accordance with the Kettleson 
court’s holding that “the access road is established to be for the 
general public.”159 
One could offer the counterargument that these cases are 
outdated, outmoded, and no longer needed in a modern and 
developed landscape.160  In fact, some states have deemed similar 
 
under the cartway statute.  Id.  The boundary of Parcel 14 is contiguous to the 
public right-of-way of TH 61 for more than two rods, but the steep grade change 
allegedly made construction of a driveway for vehicular traffic unreasonable.  Id.  
Under the cartway statute, arguably ineffective access may not qualify a landowner 
to seek relief.  See Horton v. Twp. of Helen, 624 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001).  But see Mueller v. Supervisors of Courtland, 117 Minn. 290, 297, 135 N.W. 
996, 998 (1921) (refusing to overturn a jury verdict granting a petitioner a cartway 
even though the petitioner already had inconvenient access to a public way over 
his own property). 
 156. 173 Minn. 572, 573–74, 218 N.W. 115, 115 (1928) (citing Mueller, 117 
Minn. at 296, 135 N.W. at 998). 
 157. Id. at 574, 218 N.W. at 115 (citing Mueller, 117 Minn. at 296, 135 N.W. at 
998). 
 158. Mueller, 117 Minn. at 295, 135 N.W. at 998 (quoting Stewart v. Great 
N.R.R. Co., 65 Minn. 515, 517, 68 N.W. 208, 209 (1896)). 
 159. State ex. rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Minn. 
2011).  
 160. Cartway statutes, known as private road acts in some jurisdictions, 
emanate from colonial times when the country was largely undeveloped.  
Meidinger, supra note 6, at 25 (“[S]ince the country consisted largely of wilderness 
and since the government could not hope to furnish all the roads needed, ‘the use 
of condemnation to open private roads . . . was a necessity if the country was to be 
developed at all.’” (quoting Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent 
Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 207 (1978))). 
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statutes unconstitutional.161  Or, as Lepak did, one could also make 
the argument that these cases and their interpretation of public use 
were overruled by the 2006 Amendments’ definition of public 
use.162  After all, proceedings under the cartway statute are closely 
connected to eminent domain proceedings.163  Silver v. Ridgeway 
helps to refute these counterarguments.164  Silver was decided after 
the 2006 Amendments and continued to favorably cite these 
foundational cases, holding that “establishment of a cartway creates 
a public road and therefore does not violate the constitutional 
prohibition against taking private property for a private use.”165 
This concept of a public road being defined by access has 
support in jurisdictions outside of Minnesota and in contexts 
beyond cartway statutes.  There are a number of cases from other 
states that involve a factual scenario similar to Kettleson and rely on 
a similar formulation of a public road.  In Sturgill v. Kentucky, 
Department of Highways, the appellant challenged the use of eminent 
domain to provide an access road to a hotel incidentally landlocked 
by the construction of a highway ramp.166  The court resolved the 
issue by asking “Have the public the right to [the road’s] use upon 
the same terms as the person at whose instance the way was 
established?  If they have, it is a public use; if they have not, it is a 
 
 161. See Tolksdorf v. Griffith, 626 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Mich. 2001).  The Tolksdorf 
court found that the public was not the “predominant interest served by the 
private roads act” and the public benefit was “purely incidental and far too 
attenuated to support a constitutional taking of private property.”  Id. at 168–69 
(quoting McKeigan v. Grass Lake Twp. Supervisor, 587 N.W.2d 505, 509 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1998), superseded by 593 N.W.2d 605 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999), overruled by 
Tolksdorf, 626 N.W.2d 163).  However, the facts may have affected the decision.  In 
Tolksdorf, the owners surrounding the landlocked parcel had long allowed access 
to it for recreational purposes, but the petitioner was a real estate developer who 
acquired the property with knowledge that it was landlocked, hoping to subdivide 
the property and sell lots.  Id. at 165–66.  Compare Tolksdorf with In re Opening 
Private Rd. for Benefit of O’Reilly, in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
seemed poised to also find its state’s private roads act unconstitutional.  5 A.3d 
246, 258 (Pa. 2010).  Instead, the court remanded the case to allow further 
findings of fact as to whether the proposed “private road” taking “might be 
regarded as an interconnected course of events” with a highway taking, which 
caused the petitioner to become landlocked.  Id. 
 162. See MINN. STAT. § 117.025, subdiv. 11 (2010). 
 163. Id. § 164.07, subdiv. 8 (“[The appeal] shall be tried in the same manner 
as an appeal in eminent domain proceedings under chapter 117.”). 
 164. 733 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 165. Id. at 169 (citing Mueller v. Supervisors of Courtland, 117 Minn. 290, 296, 
135 N.W. 996, 998 (1921)). 
 166. 384 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Ky. 1964). 
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private one.”167  In a similar situation in Ohio, the court held that a 
condemnation for a disputed access road was valid because it would 
be “open to the public and used by the public as a means of ingress 
and egress to and from the business conducted on these 
premises.”168  Further, the Washington high court explained, “Any 
public way naturally confers a special benefit on those persons 
whose property adjoins it.  All roads terminate somewhere.  Dead 
end streets or highways inevitably and particularly subserve the 
private interests of the last property owner on the line.”169  There is 
no shortage of jurisdictions that have ascribed to this principle.170 
Admittedly, defining a public road by access, not by use, may 
not be inherently intuitive.171  However, the weight of authority in 
Minnesota subscribes to this theory.  And even though this 
authority is cartway precedent, it is difficult to see how the 
underlying facts of these cases are different enough to warrant 
separate treatment.  There seems to be no reason why cartway 
petitions should be treated under this broad “public access is 
public use” rule, while lands incidentally landlocked by highway 
construction should be evaluated under a different, stricter 
framework.  The problems are sufficiently analogous to merit 
extension of this long-held cartway precedent to the Kettleson access 
road.  For these reasons, the court made the correct decision as to 
the nature of the road. 
2. Looking at the “Project as a Whole” and “Economy to the State” to 
Locate a Public Use 
The court supported its public use decision by stating that the 
 
 167. Id. at 92 (citing Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Moreland, 104 S.W. 762, 765 
(1907)). 
 168. May v. Ohio Tpk. Comm’n, 178 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ohio 1962). 
 169. State v. Belmont Improvement Co., 495 P.2d 635, 639 (Wash. 1972). 
 170. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 229 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 1967) (“[T]he 
Legislature properly intended such service roads would constitute a public use 
whether such road served one property owner or many.”); State v. Totowa Lumber 
& Supply Co., 232 A.2d 655, 659 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (“The number of 
people who will participate in or benefit by the use for which the property is 
condemned is not the determinant of whether the use is or is not a public one.”). 
 171. Similar to Lepak’s argument, in this author’s opinion the Kettleson access 
road does have the appearance of a driveway leading directly to the Parcel’s 
garage.  Even the local fire authority appears to recognize the road as a driveway as 
it has placed the fire number for Parcel 14 on the north side of the approach from 
TH 61 (closest to Parcel 16) adding to its appearance as such.  See Photograph: 
Kettleson access road with accompanying fire number (Aug. 2012) (on file with 
author). 
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highway improvement was “without question a transportation plan 
with the over-arching purpose of providing a public benefit,”172 but 
also stating that it “need not decide whether the project must be 
viewed as a whole or whether each individual aspect . . . must be 
examined for a public purpose.”173  In addition, the court quoted 
Minnesota Statutes section 161.24, expressly stating that “MnDOT 
also may acquire land by eminent domain” for “‘connecting the 
closed-off highway, street, private road, or entrance with another 
public highway.’”174  Yet, the court went on to state, in reference to 
section 161.24, that “[w]e do not decide whether the new 
definition of public purpose has invalidated the statutory provisions 
that allow the Commissioner to condemn land ‘necessary for 
connecting’ a private road that is closed off by the highway 
project.”175  It is difficult to know how to interpret these apparently 
conflicting and contradictory statements. 
That a given project should be “taken as a whole” and section 
161.24’s stated rationale of “economy to the state” are arguments 
that have been used in past Minnesota cases and in many other 
jurisdictions facing situations similar to Kettleson to help identify a 
proper public purpose.  Perhaps the court’s opposing statements 
on these points may be best interpreted as implied endorsements 
of these propositions as useful tools in locating the limit of proper 
public use, yet a manifest desire to limit the scope of its decision. 
a. Kelmar: A Homegrown Example 
A sufficiently analogous example of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court using “economy to the state” and “taken as a whole” 
arguments to support a challenged condemnation can be found in 
Kelmar Corp. v. District Court.176  The factual scenario of Kelmar is 
different than Kettleson, yet the decision is instructive.  In Kelmar, 
MnDOT sought to condemn a portion of the Kelmar Corporation’s 
land in conjunction with the construction of the Interstate Trunk 
Highway No. 494 bridge over the Minnesota River.177  However, 
Kelmar’s condemned land was not to be used directly by MnDOT.  
 
 172. State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Minn. 
2011) (emphasis added).  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 164 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 161.24, subdiv. 4 (2010)). 
 175. Id. at 167 (quoting § 161.24, subdiv. 2). 
 176. 269 Minn. 137, 130 N.W.2d 228 (1964). 
 177. Id. at 138, 130 N.W.2d at 229. 
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Instead, Kelmar’s land would be utilized by the U.S. Corps of 
Engineers (the “Corps”) in an independent project of 
straightening the Minnesota River.178  By condemning Kelmar’s 
property for use by the Corps, the Corps could modify their project 
and allow MnDOT to build a bridge 1500 feet shorter, equating to 
a savings of $1,646,362 for the state.179 
Kelmar objected, contending that the purpose of the 
condemnation “is not for highway purposes, that the taking is not 
necessary but is arbitrary and capricious, and is beyond the 
authority of the Commissioner of Highways to acquire.”180  The 
court held: 
We are convinced, however, from an examination of the 
record and authorities, that the taking of the property in 
question is for a public purpose.  Although the direct 
physical use of the property in question will not be for 
highway purposes, its use is nevertheless incidental to and 
related to that purpose.  The acquisition of the property 
in question will make it possible to relocate the main 
channel of the river so that a bridge may be constructed 
which will more conveniently and economically serve as a 
public facility.181 
The court looked at the project as a whole and found that since the 
taking was “incidental” to highway purposes it was valid.182  This is 
the essence of the “project as a whole” argument.  Identifying the 
“economy to the state” argument needs no explanation.  One 
major difference between Kelmar and Kettleson is the proposed 
“non-highway” use for the MnDOT-condemned land.  Use by the 
Corps for the purpose of maintaining a navigable river is a more 
apparent “public use” than the Kettleson access road.  Nevertheless, 
Kelmar illustrates the principle that the “economy to the state” and 
the nature of a taking as incidental to a highway purpose is 
something the court will consider. 
b. Not a New Problem: Highway Construction and Isolated 
Properties in Other Jurisdictions 
Not surprisingly, the landlocked issue presented in Kettleson is 
 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 139, 130 N.W.2d at 230. 
 180. Id. at 140, 130 N.W.2d at 230. 
 181. Id. at 141, 130 N.W.2d at 231. 
 182. Id.  
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/14
  
364 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1 
not a unique situation.  There is a relatively sizeable sample of cases 
from jurisdictions across the country in which similar situations 
have sparked public use challenges.  Where the public use is 
validated, courts typically rely on the same list of justifications, 
particularly the familiar “project as a whole” and “economy to the 
state” propositions. 
Luke v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority183 appears to be one of 
the early and influential cases addressing the issue of restoring 
access to land parcels rendered landlocked by highway 
construction.  In Luke, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority 
sought a permanent easement across two parcels for the purpose of 
providing ingress and egress to a third parcel, which was deprived 
access to a public right-of-way due to no-access provisions in the 
construction of a tollway.184  Following a public use challenge by 
one of the neighboring parcels burdened by the easement, the 
court concluded: 
If the easement or the private way should be viewed in the 
abstract, no public purpose would appear.  Such an 
approach, however, would be closing the eyes to reality.  
The laying out of the turnpike . . . and the acquisition of 
numerous sites essential to that object are attributes of 
one huge undertaking.  Procuring an easement and 
creating a right of way for the benefit of parcels of land 
incidentally deprived of all or of some means of access to 
an existing way are but a by-product of that undertaking.  
The authority was not engaged in a “roving 
commission.”185 
The fact that the taking was a by-product of a highway project 
has proved persuasive in the series of cases that followed Luke’s 
lead.186  Two cases from North Carolina show that if the lost access 
and taking is a by-product of a highway project, it can be the 
 
 183. 149 N.E.2d 225 (Mass. 1958). 
 184. Id. at 226. 
 185. Id. at 228 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).   
 186. See Miss. State Highway Comm’n v. Morgan, 175 So.2d 606, 609 (Miss. 
1965) (“[A] mere by-product of laying out the highway . . . .”); State v. Totowa 
Lumber & Supply Co., 232 A.2d 655, 660 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (“The 
reasoning used by the Massachusetts court is applicable to this case.”); May v. Ohio 
Tpk. Comm’n, 178 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ohio 1962) (“The reasoning used by the 
Massachusetts court is applicable to this case.  In the construction of a turnpike, 
which is for ‘the public welfare’ and ‘the public use,’ it is often necessary that 
certain parcels of land be left without access.”); see also 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 
31 (2012); SACKMAN, supra note 2, § 7.06[5] (identifying Luke as a leading case, 
which many legal commentaries have expounded upon). 
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controlling fact.  Independent from a larger project, in 1965 the 
North Carolina Supreme Court overruled a highway department’s 
condemnation to establish a certain cul-de-sac, holding that it 
would be “for the substantial and dominant use and benefit of [one 
family] . . . and that the use by, or any benefit for, the general 
public will be only incidental.”187  However, four years later, the 
state appellate court reached a different conclusion when the facts 
were closer to the facts of Kettleson.188  After a parcel was landlocked 
due to the construction of a controlled access highway, the court, 
citing Luke, found the highway commission had “ample authority 
for the taking here in question as this taking was necessary in order 
for it to ‘properly prosecute the work’ involved with [the] 
project.”189  This language strongly suggests that the nature of the 
taking was seen as incidental to a highway project, a fact that 
helped nudge the court over the line to find a valid public use. 
“Economy to the state” is an equally compelling rationale for 
many states.  Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized 
that financial considerations are a valid part of the public use 
equation.190  The Kentucky court noted that a taking to create a 
new access road to serve a landlocked motel would alleviate the 
motel’s access issue and “incidentally . . . save a substantial amount 
of money (to which [the motel owner] would be entitled as 
condemnation damages).”191  The Mississippi court recognized that 
destruction of access was unavoidable in limited access highway 
projects and, therefore, highway departments need a wide measure 
of discretion in laying out these roads in order to keep “with their 
duty not to expend public moneys needlessly.”192  Perhaps it was the 
Indiana Supreme Court that most forcefully relied on this 
“economy to the state” rationale.193  The court stated, “If the State 
 
 187. State Highway Comm’n v. Batts, 144 S.E.2d 126, 136 (N.C. 1965). 
 188. See N.C. Highway Comm’n v. Ashville Sch. Inc., 169 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1969). 
 189. Id. at 198 (citation omitted). 
 190. U.S. ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 554 (1946) (“[T]he 
fact that the authority wanted to prevent a waste of government funds . . . [did not 
detract] from its power to condemn . . . .  The cost of public projects is a relevant 
element in all of them, and the government, just as anyone else, is not required to 
proceed oblivious to elements of cost . . . .  And when serious problems are created 
by its public projects, the Government is not barred from making a common sense 
adjustment in the interest of all the public.”). 
 191. Sturgill v. Ky., Dep’t of Highways, 384 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Ky. 1964). 
 192. Miss. State Highway Comm’n v. Morgan, 175 So.2d 606, 609 (Miss. 1965). 
 193. See Andrews v. State, 229 N.E.2d 806 (Ind. 1967). 
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of Indiana is not in a position to minimize the damages paid to 
land owners, then the cost of Interstate Highways would soar 
astronomically and Indiana would be dotted abnormally with land-
locked real estate.”194  There are other examples of states that find 
saving money a useful element in justifying similar takings, though 
there are detractors.195 
The preceding litany of cases is offered to merely add some 
context and background to the court’s decision.  There is plenty of 
persuasive precedent to support the court’s decision.  These cases 
offer more evidence that there is no easily definable public use in 
these situations; just a judicial weighing of what is “clearly 
conducive to the welfare of the community,”196 with “no single 
fact . . . controlling.”197  Thomas Merrill showed his frustration with 
this amorphous public use analysis when after Midkiff he observed, 
“[C]ourts have no theory or conceptual foundation from which 
meaningful standards for judicial review of public use issues might 
originate” and that “cases are filled with clichés regarding the 
‘breadth’ and ‘elasticity’ of the ‘evolving’ concept of public           
use . . . .”198  Merrill offered economic theory as an alternative, 
which offers a unique perspective to analyze cases like Kettleson.199 
 
 194. Id. at 810.  Also citing an Indiana statute allowing condemnation for 
service roads, the court found that “the Legislature properly intended such service 
roads would constitute a public use whether such road served one property owner 
or many.”  Id. 
 195. See, e.g., State v. Totowa Lumber & Supply Co., 232 A.2d 655, 660 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (“[T]he proposed plan [to build an access road to a 
5.3-acre plot of another party which otherwise would be landlocked] was the most 
economical of all the other legally possible solutions to the problem here 
present.”); State v. Davis, 209 A.2d 633, 635 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965) 
(“[T]aking only the land needed for the freeway and then unlocking the resulting 
large landlocked areas by condemnation of land for this access road . . . was a 
seemingly more economical solution of the problem . . . .”).  But see, e.g., Ark. State 
Highway Comm’n v. Alcott, 539 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Ark. 1976) (holding that an 
access road that would “substantially reduce right-of-way costs and, therefore, 
would be in the best interest of the state” was a “private driveway” and not for a 
public use, and therefore outside the powers of the state); Saunders v. Titus Cnty. 
Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 1, 847 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
that these types of takings are “based on economic grounds rather than public use 
and [are] justified on the grounds that it will save the public money because there 
will be no necessity for condemning the entire tract because there is no access”).  
 196. See SACKMAN, supra note 2, § 7.02[1]. 
 197. State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 167 (Minn. 
2011). 
 198. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 63–
64 (1986) (citation omitted). 
 199. Id. at 72–94. 
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C. A Different Perspective: Economic Theory and Eminent Domain 
Kettleson and other landlocked property cases are emblematic 
of a fundamental theoretical economic justification for eminent 
domain: a market failure.200  Not surprisingly, the court did not 
engage in this non-legal reasoning.  However, it is worth noting 
certain economic arguments which provide an alternative 
perspective as to how a road that principally benefits one private 
party can be a valid exercise of eminent domain. 
1. Holdouts, Bilateral Monopoly, and Rent Seeking 
The market failure illustrated in these cases is essentially a 
form of the “holdout problem,” a basic and widely discussed 
economic argument for eminent domain.201  The holdout problem 
occurs when a landowner is unwilling to voluntarily sell his or her 
land to the government when the government seeks the land for a 
project that will have certain socially desirable benefits and an 
overall economic surplus.202  This problem is particularly applicable 
to right-of-way-acquiring entities like a highway department.203  In 
right-of-way acquisitions, the holdout problem can lead to 
increased transaction costs when, after the route for a highway is 
selected and changing that route becomes very costly, property 
 
 200. Thomas Miceli provides a helpful explanation of market failures and their 
relation to eminent domain that is best conveyed by quotation:  
[E]minent domain is a forced sale of property from the current owner to 
another owner . . . in an effort to achieve some public objective.  The 
question is, why does the sale have to be forced?  According to economic 
theory, the purpose of exchange, whether voluntary or involuntary, is to 
transfer resources to higher-valued uses; in other words, to realize some 
gains from trade.  Under ideal conditions, that goal is best achieved 
through ordinary market exchange, with the government’s role being 
limited to the protection of property rights and the enforcement of 
contracts.  Any departure from this paradigm is therefore justifiable only 
if there is some reason to believe that the market will fail to operate 
efficiently.  
THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN 151 (2011). 
 201. See id. at 27–31; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (8th ed. 
2011). 
 202. See MICELI, supra note 200, at 27–31.  Economic surplus refers to the 
increased value of the land after the transfer or transactions.  Cohen, supra note 
14, at 539.  One critique of eminent domain is that the condemnor reaps all the 
benefits of the economic surplus because the condemnee is only compensated for 
the “market value of the property at the time of the taking” and not “any element 
resulting subsequently to or because of the taking.”  Id. at 539 n.330. 
 203. POSNER, supra note 201, at 71. 
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owners “in the path of the advancing line [are] tempted to hold 
out for a very high price.”204  The economic issue with this situation 
is one of efficient allocation of resources.205  Land is held by owners 
seeking inflated compensation for their land, leading to increased 
cost of highway construction, delay, and possibly abandonment of 
publicly beneficial projects.206  When projects are abandoned for 
this reason, land is left “in its existing, less valuable uses, and this is 
inefficient.”207 
Holdouts seeking inflated compensation may have different 
motivations, and this is an important distinction to note.  There are 
strategic owners that are simply looking to extract as large a portion 
as possible of the economic surplus created by the transaction.208  
Alternatively, there are idiosyncratic owners for which “no mutually 
agreeable price may exist for a number of reasons: a person might 
hold a sentimental attachment to his land, have sufficient wealth to 
meet his needs, and be unwilling to sell the land for any price the 
state is willing to offer.”209  Idiosyncratic owners often embody the 
principle that all land is unique, so there is a subjective value often 
difficult to ascertain and properly account for in the just 
compensation calculation.210 
The access roads in Kettleson and the other cases are not strict 
holdout problems, but are “bilateral monopoly” problems, a sub-
category of the holdout phenomenon.211  A bilateral monopoly is a 
transaction including only one buyer and one seller where neither 
party has an alternative but to negotiate with the other.212  As one 
author notes: 
A single buyer and single seller may not be able to reach a 
mutually agreeable price, even though one exists, because 
neither the buyer nor the seller has any alternative party 
with whom to bargain.  The result is excessive haggling 
over the surplus, and this haggling may entail transaction 
costs that are high and, in some instances, prohibitive if 
they exceed the gains-from-trade.213 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id.  
 206. MICELI, supra note 200, at 28. 
 207. POSNER, supra note 201, at 71. 
 208. See Kelly, supra note 5.  
 209. Id. at 348 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 210. Id. 
 211. MICELI, supra note 200, at 34–35. 
 212. Id. at 35. 
 213. Kelly, supra note 5, at 349. 
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Landlocked parcels are a quintessential bilateral monopoly 
situation.214  The bilateral monopoly of the landlocked parcel 
problem has prompted courts and legislatures to allow a private 
party to compel a transfer of land from an existing owner, as in the 
case of the above discussed private road acts.215 
2. Merrill’s Economics of Public Use 
In 1986, Thomas Merrill offered a theory to refashion the 
public use analysis from an economic perspective in his influential 
article, The Economics of Public Use.216  Kettleson provides an 
opportunity to revisit Merrill’s argument and determine if his 
suggested framework provides helpful insight into the economics 
of the court’s decision.  Merrill starts with the same premises 
discussed above: that eminent domain can be justified by market 
failures and the holdout problem.217  This is what Merrill calls a 
“thin market setting,” which is what induces the strategic owner’s 
behavior and excessive haggling that leads to “monopoly pricing by 
the seller, to unacceptably high transaction costs, or to both.”218 
Merrill goes on to theorize that thin markets and their 
potential to produce rent seeking behavior “make it economically 
efficient to confer the power of eminent domain on a buyer.”219  
After factoring in the extra “‘due process’ costs of eminent 
domain,”220 Merrill hypothesizes that in a truly “thin market 
setting,” the use of eminent domain is “self-regulating.”221  That is, 
if there is not a thin market and the related market exchange 
failures discussed above, then the government is unlikely to use 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. See supra Part IV.B.1.  However, Miceli cautions that there “is the risk that 
any two-party transaction could potentially be labeled as a bilateral monopoly, 
given the unobservability of transaction costs.”  MICELI, supra note 200, at 35.  In a 
holdout situation, contrary to a bilateral monopoly, the presence of many sellers 
“is evidence that bargaining is likely to fail.”  Id.  Miceli suggest that courts should 
more closely scrutinize takings in such two-party transactions.  Id. 
 216. Merrill, supra note 198. 
 217. Id. at 65 (“I argue that eminent domain’s purpose is to overcome barriers 
to voluntary exchange created when a seller of resources is in position to extract 
economic rents from a buyer.”). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 76. 
 220. Id. at 77 (explaining that the eminent domain procedure is expensive and 
requires drafting and filing a complaint, serving process, securing a formal 
appraisal, the possibility of trial, and appeal, etc.). 
 221. Id. at 80. 
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eminent domain because it will be more expensive than transacting 
in the open market.  Consequently, Merrill concludes that in this 
setting, “courts need do nothing to limit the use of eminent 
domain,” reinforcing the judicial deference annunciated in Berman, 
Midkiff, and Kelo.222  The alternative public use inquiry is then to 
identify market failures, which gives the judiciary a different role in 
reviewing the exercise of eminent domain, that is, “a more narrowly 
focused and judicially manageable inquiry.”223 
3. Application to Kettleson 
Kettleson appears to acutely illustrate the bilateral monopoly 
issue.  The buyer (MnDOT) and the seller (Lepak) had no other 
option but to negotiate with each other.  By holding out, Lepak 
could gain a much more favorable bargaining position because the 
state’s only alternative was to compensate Parcel 14 for the loss of 
access.224  Negotiations failed as each party sought to secure for 
themselves the largest share of the surplus profit.225  In a very 
rudimentary sense, the surplus profit could be represented by the 
likely gross difference in value between the complete loss of access 
to a $371,200 parcel (Parcel 15),226 and a 35 foot strip of a $69,600 
parcel (Parcel 14).227  This apparent disparity in relative values 
seems to provide strong evidence of a holdout or bilateral 
monopoly problem.  Together, MnDOT, the general public, and 
Parcel 15 appear to be the higher-value users of the property, 
which, if in their possession, would result in certain socially 
desirable benefits and an overall economic surplus.  Thus, Merrill’s 
basic premise lends support to the conclusion that the court’s 
decision is further supported by the presence of a market failure, 
and with that market failure, the state’s exercise of eminent 
 
 222. Id. at 81; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 223. Merrill, supra note 198, at 67. 
 224. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 440, 127 N.W.2d 165, 169 
(1964) (“The weight of authority, including Minnesota, treats access to a public 
highway from abutting property as a right which may not be denied without 
compensation.”). 
 225. See MICELI, supra note 200, at 35 (describing how transaction costs 
increase in bilateral monopolies). 
 226. Tax Statement for Wendell L. & Linda E. Herron, Trustees, Property ID: 25-047-
0020, COOK CNTY. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.co.cook.mn.us/property/detail.php 
?pid=25-047-0020. 
 227. Tax Statement for Richard Stanley Lepak, Property ID: 25-047-0010, COOK 
CNTY. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.co.cook.mn.us/property/detail.php?pid=25-047 
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domain would seem self-regulating and appropriate to receive 
judicial deference on economic grounds alone. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Public use is a notoriously indefinable requisite to a valid, 
constitutional exercise of the government’s eminent domain 
power.  There is well-established precedent in both the United 
States as a whole and Minnesota specifically, that the courts will 
defer to legislative determinations of public use.  These legislative 
choices are reversed by the judiciary only when clearly erroneous, 
arbitrary, or capricious.228  This extensive discretion granted to 
highway departments like MnDOT, and other legislative-
empowered condemning authorities, means eminent domain 
petitions are rarely overruled by the court. 
When a taking is challenged in isolated property cases like 
Kettleson, courts have long been challenged to clearly articulate why 
using eminent domain to establish an access road is a valid public 
use.  After all, the isolated parcel owner appears to be the 
dominant beneficiary, not the public.  The Kettleson court was 
similarly unable to identify any single governing principle as to why 
the taking was valid.  To find a public use in these cases, courts 
have consistently offered a series of similar justifications.  They 
define a public road as simply any road accessible by the public.229  
In highway cases like Kettleson, they find the challenged taking is 
incidental to the larger, indisputably public use.  They reason that 
the public finances must be protected.  Or, in an attempt to bring 
some logical framework to the fluid, fact-specific judicial analysis of 
public use,  theorists  leave  the  legal  realm altogether in search of 
economic answers.  This note shows that perhaps the best that can 
be done in challenging public use cases is to look at a range of 
analogous cases, theories, and persuasive precedent to determine 
whether the facts fall within the generally accepted range of “public 
use.”  After all, no fact is controlling. 
 
 
 228. State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 165 (Minn. 
2011). 
 229. Id. at 167. 
36
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/14
